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of the effect is such that changes in energy price differences across time explain less than 0.01% of the variation
in trade ﬂows. Simulations based on our model predict that a €40–65/tCO2 price of carbon in the EU ETS would
increase Europe's imports from the rest of the world by less than 0.05% and decrease exports by 0.2%.
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Do higher energy prices cause sectors to lose industrial export com-
petitiveness? The rising price of energy remains a politically sensitive
issue, particularly in energy import dependent regions such as Europe
and Japan. Several new trends contribute to this: the slow recovery
since the 2008 ﬁnancial crisis, the shale gas boom in the US with the
consequent fall in energy prices for US manufacturers, the costly transi-
tion from fossil fuel and nuclear to renewable energy sources notably in
Europe, and the increased competition from emerging economies. Stan-
dard trade models predict that by making domestic production more
costly, policies that increase energy price will put domestic ﬁrms at a
strategic disadvantage relative to foreign rivals facing lower energy
prices. This result forms the basis of the so-called Pollution Haven Hy-
pothesis (Levinson and Taylor, 2008; Taylor and Copeland, 2004),
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. This is an open access article underdistribution of polluting industries between countries. According to
this theory, producers respond to higher energy prices or more strin-
gent environmental regulation by producing fewer energy-intensive
goods whichmay lead to a decline in net exports and the partial reloca-
tion of production to a region with low energy prices or less stringent
regulation (Hanna, 2010). However, energy costs are only one of
many factors that inﬂuence imports and relocation. These include ex-
change rate risks, transport costs, trade agreements, political institu-
tions, proximity to demand, access to raw materials, and relative costs
of labour, capital and other input costs (Demailly and Quirion, 2008).
For this reason, whether and to what degree changes in relative energy
prices might inﬂuence trade and competitiveness remains poorly un-
derstood. The objective of this paper is to examine this effect using his-
torical data on trade and energy prices from 1996 to 2011 covering 42
countries and 62 sectors representing 60% of global merchandise trade
during that period.
The question of whether trade has historically responded to energy
price differences remains largely unanswered empirically. As a conse-
quence, our understanding of the impact of regional asymmetries in car-
bon prices on trade is limited, as is our understanding of the
environmental efﬁcacy of such policies. Yet, as countries implement car-
bon pricing policies at different speeds, there is considerable interest in
assessing the potential trade impacts of climate change mitigation poli-
cies, particularly for energy intensive trade-exposed sectors. The litera-
ture on the links between climate policy and international trade1 and in1 See Levinson and Taylor (2008), Levinson (2010), Copeland and Taylor (2003), Jaffe
et al. (1995) and Jeppesen et al. (2002) for reviews of the wider literature on the effects
of environmental policies on trade.
the CC BY license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
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achieved by a carbon emission reduction policy is directly offset by an
increase in emissions outside of the regulated region) has so far relied
on ex-ante model simulation strategies, typically using CGE models2
(e.g., Babiker, 2005; Burniaux and Martins, 2000; Gerlagh and Kuik,
2007; Kuik and Gerlagh, 2003; Paltsev, 2001) or partial equilibrium
analysis in the context of the EuropeanUnion Emissions Trading System
(EU ETS)3 (e.g., Demailly and Quirion, 2006; Demailly and Quirion,
2008; Hourcade et al., 2007; Monjon and Quirion, 2009) but the results
are decisively mixed, highlighting the need for empirical analysis in
order to better understand the nature and magnitude of these effects.
The lack of empirical evidence may be attributable to several factors.
Firstly, although carbon mitigation policies targeting industry sector
emissions have recently proliferated across the world – including the
EU ETS, New Zealand's ETS, the UK's Climate Change Levy, California's
climate programme, British Columbia's carbon tax scheme and China's
pilot emission trading schemes – the nascent nature of the majority of
schemes means that there is a lack of observed data.4 Secondly, where
carbon prices have existed, the levels have been low, preventing re-
searchers from disentangling the effect of small carbon prices from the
multitude ofmore dominant factors that drive trade and investment de-
cisions. Thirdly, it is difﬁcult to compare the relative stringency of
existing carbon pricing policies in a meaningful way (Aldy and Pizer,
2014; Sato et al., 2015). Complications arise, for example, in the EU
ETS where allowances were allocated for free to most sectors in the
ﬁrst two implementing phases.
This paper aims to overcome these limitations and to establish
whether changes in energy price differences between trading partners
affect trade ﬂows between these countries, using a large dataset cover-
ing 42 countries at varying levels of economic development (over 1600
country pairs) and 62 sectors for the period 1996 to 2011. Contrary to
climate change regulations, energy prices have the advantage of being
readily comparable across countries, sectors and time, and data is avail-
able for a large set of countries and a long time period. Following Aldy
and Pizer (2011), we postulate that historic asymmetries in industrial
energy prices offer insights into the impact of asymmetric carbon prices
in the future, owing to the fact that carbon priceswork by increasing the
effective price of energy for industry. The analysis is conducted at the
sector level, allowing us to control for country-level macroeconomic
shocks and for factors that affect bilateral trade andmight be correlated
with energy price differences, such as exchange rates, transport costs,
trade agreements, and relative labour costs. The richness of the data2 See Dröge (2009) and Zhou et al. (2010) for a review of this literature. This group of
studies simulates different emission reduction targets under the Kyoto Protocol and have
estimatedawide range of carbon leakage rates. Central estimates are in the range of 5–25%
according to Dröge (2009) and 15–30% according to Lanz et al. (2011). However, in some
cases, models report leakage rates below zero because of positive emission effects in the
model, which are due to the role of technology spillover from mitigation (Barker et al.,
2007). Others report leakage rates above 100%, which imply that emission reduction ef-
forts in one region leads to more global GHG emissions rather than less (if production
moves to regions with less efﬁcient technology for example).
3 These studies examine the potential impacts of climate policies on trade and invest-
ment for heavy industry andhighlight sectoral differences in carbon leakage rates estimat-
ed in thesemodels which reﬂect the differences in parameters such as carbon intensity of
production, abatement potential, ability to pass through abatement costs to consumers, as
well as different levels of sensitivity to multiple barriers of trade (e.g., product differenti-
ation, service differentiation, transport costs, capacity constraints and import restrictions).
Higher carbon leakage rates are estimated for the steel sector which exhibit high product
differentiation but also higher abatement potential, relative to the cement sector, which is
characterised by homogeneous products but high transport costs relative to value.
4 An exception is the Kyoto Protocolwhichwas ratiﬁed in 1997. Aichele and Felbermayr
(2012) derive a gravity equation for the carbon content of trade andﬁnd that commitment
to the Kyoto Protocol is associated with a decrease in domestic emissions by 7%, but also
with an increase in the share of imported embodied carbon emissions over domestic emis-
sions by about 14%. Using a matching method, Aichele and Felbermayr (2011) ﬁnd that
Kyoto countries' exports are reduced by 14% compared to a counterfactual scenario. How-
ever, since the paper uses country-level data a concern is that the Kyoto dummy variable
also captures other macro-economic shocks correlated with both exports and Kyoto rati-
ﬁcation, such as China's accession to the WTO in 2002 (Branger and Quirion, 2014).allows us to include a large range of country, sector and time ﬁxed ef-
fects, thereby purging the estimates froma range of potential confound-
ing factors.
This paper contributes to a small recent literature which seeks to
empirically examine the relationship between historic energy prices
and trade. Aldy and Pizer (2011) focus on the US and use historical
variation in industrial electricity price across states to investigate its
effect on sectoral production and consumption. This enables an empiri-
cal investigation of the impact of carbon pricing on the US industrial
supply and demand, despite the absence of carbon pricing in the US
historically. They show that an increase in energy prices in the US
following the introduction of a $15/ton carbon tax would induce a do-
mestic production decline of between 3 and 4% among energy-
intensive sectors and a roughly 1% increase in imports. The authors
also ﬁnd evidence that responses to energy prices are bigger for
industries with higher energy intensity. Gerlagh and Mathys (2011)
use a country speciﬁc energy abundancemeasure to proxy for marginal
energy costs, and investigate its impact on net exports using a panel of
14 high income (OECD) countries over 28 years. The authors ﬁnd that
there is high correlation between energy abundance and price, and
that energy abundant countries have a high level of energy embodied
in exports relative to imports. These results therefore provide support
to the existence of a carbon leakage effect. Our paper builds on these
studies, using a muchwider dataset, covering 62 sectors in 42 countries
over 15 years.
We ﬁnd evidence that a widening of the energy price gap has a
statistically signiﬁcant but small effect on bilateral exports: a 10% in-
crease in the energy price gap between two countries within a given
sector translates on average into a 0.2% increase in imports. This result
is robust across a wide range of alternative model speciﬁcations and es-
timators. Consistent with expectations, we ﬁnd that energy price differ-
ences have a larger impact on trade in energy-intensive sectors.
However, even in these sectors the impact is small. Overall, energy
price differences across time explain less than 0.01% of the variation in
trade ﬂows, suggesting that differences in energy prices are a marginal
driver of trade globally.
We also use our estimates to conduct policy simulations and evalu-
ate the degree to which stricter carbon pricing policies in Europe
would affect trade patterns. Our results suggest that a €40–65/tCO2
price of carbon in the EU ETS would increase Europe's imports from
the rest of the world by around 0.04% and decrease exports by 0.2%.
To put things into perspective, consider that imports from European
countries have grown at an average annual rate of 6.5% between 1995
and 2011 and at the rate of 15.6% since 2009. Hence, the impact of
higher EU ETS prices on European imports would appear to be small
compared with other drivers of trade.
This paper has important policy implications. It suggests that
concerns about carbon leakage are not unfounded but may have been
largely overplayed.Whilst efforts to price carbon are spreading globally,
governments are consistently pressured to compensate energy inten-
sive trade-exposed sectors, because of the assumed adverse impacts of
climate change policies on their export competitiveness. European in-
dustries actively lobby for continued free allocation of permits within
the EU ETS and in the US, proposals to use output-based allocation for
the upcoming emission trading schemes are also justiﬁed on fear of
leakage effects, although subsidising output reduces efﬁciency of the
overall system as it shields product prices from the real cost of carbon
(Fischer and Fox, 2007; Hepburn et al., 2006). Our results suggest that,
although energy price differences have some impact on trade, the
magnitude of this effect is small, in particular when compared to other
factors affecting trade ﬂows.
The structure of this paper is as follows. Section 2 presents our con-
ceptual framework and empirical strategy. The data is described in
Section 3. Section 4 reports and discusses the empirical results and the
magnitude of the effect. In Section 5 we use our estimation results to
simulate the impact of a higher carbon price in the EU ETS on
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remarks.
2. Conceptual framework and empirical strategy
2.1. Conceptual framework
A large theoretical literature has investigated the consequences of
unequal environmental regulatory stringency on trade and competi-
tiveness. Most models consider a local pollutant that is emitted during
the production process of the ﬁnal good and pollution emission taxes
imposed to reduce polluting emissions, but the framework equally ap-
plies to energy or carbon taxes implemented to reduce carbon emis-
sions. Standard models predict that by making domestic production
more costly, policies that increase energy price will put domestic ﬁrms
at a strategic disadvantage relative to foreign rivals if companies are
competing with foreign counterparts with lower energy prices. This re-
sults forms the basis of the so-called Pollution Haven Hypothesis
(Levinson and Taylor, 2008; Taylor and Copeland, 2004). For producers
of energy intensive products, higher energy prices could increase mar-
ginal production costs considerably. Depending on the degree to
which they can pass the increased costs onto the consumer (i.e., the de-
gree of competition they face) and on themagnitude and persistence of
the energy price difference vis-a-vis their competitors, they may re-
spond by producing fewer energy-intensive goods, which may lead to
a decline in net exports and the partial relocation of production to a re-
gion with lower energy prices or less stringent regulation (Hanna,
2010).5
It is easy to see that in amodelwhere two countries are identical ex-
cept for differences in environmental policy (or energy taxes), the coun-
try with weaker policy will specialise in the production of the polluting
good, and export that good to the “virtuous” country. In practice, how-
ever,many factors inﬂuence production costs, including labour costs, in-
frastructures, institutions, and proximity to customers (Demailly and
Quirion, 2008). Hence, only if environmental costs dominate these
other costs would one expect a change in relative environmental policy
stringency to induce some relocation of activities (Copeland and Taylor,
2003). Another possibility is that even if marginal production costs in-
crease, producers may be able to pass on the increase in energy prices
to their consumers because of high transport costs or product differen-
tiation from imports such that their trade and investment decisions are
unaffected by rising energy costs. The Porter hypothesis (Porter, 1991;
Porter and vander Linde, 1995) even asserts that environmental regula-
tions, by inducing ﬁrms to innovate in new pollution-control technolo-
gies, might have a positive impact on productivity and proﬁtability,
which may increase ﬁrms' export competitiveness. These contradicting
theories suggests that empirical analysis will play an important role in
improving our understanding of the relationship between relative ener-
gy prices and trade.
2.2. Empirical approach
In this paper we estimate the reduced-form short-term effects of en-
ergy price differences on bilateral trade at the sector level. Relative in-
dustrial energy prices affect trade ﬂows through the induced change
in relative production costs between trading partners. Because carbon
prices work by increasing the effective cost of energy for industry, the
results can be used to infer the effects of potential asymmetries in
carbon price on future trade patterns,6 with the obvious limitation
that it is not possible to simulate the impact of carbon price differences5 In a general equilibrium framework, sectors unaffected by pollution taxes then beneﬁt
from factor reallocation and could then see an increase in net exports.
6 This is because the level of carbon emissions is largely attributable to energy combus-
tion in production (although in some processes, there are non-energy related emissions
also such as process emissions in cement production).larger than what has been observed in the past. This is useful because
whilst experience with carbon prices is still limited globally, historic
data on industrial energy prices exists for many countries and many
years.Moreover, Sato et al. (2015) show thatmost of the variation in en-
ergy price differences between countries comes from variation in ener-
gy taxes. Hence, energy price differences reﬂect differences in energy
and carbon policies between countries.
We use a gravity framework and, in line with the recent empirical
trade literature, we estimate the gravity equation in its multiplicative
form (Santos Silva and Tenreyro, 2006). Since the value of trade be-
tween two countries in any period is a non-negative integer, it is natural
to model the conditional mean as a log-link function of explanatory fac-
tors and use a Poisson maximum likelihood estimator.7 Our empirical
model is:
importsijst ¼ exp

λp
Xn
p¼1
importsi js t−pð Þ þ β1epgapijct−1 þ β2gdpti jt−1
þ β3gdpsimi jt−1 þ β4r f aci jt−1 þ β5wagegapijct−1
þ β6reerratioi jt−1

ηi js þ νijst
ð1Þ
where importsijst is the value of annual imports by country i from coun-
try j for sector s at time t and vijst is the error term. Our main variable of
interest, the lagged difference in energy price between two tradingpart-
ners, is deﬁned as epgapijst − 1 which is the difference in the logs of en-
ergy prices, or in other words the log of the ratio of energy prices:
epgapijst−1 þ ln Epist−1ð Þ ln Epjst−1
 
where Epist − 1 and Epjst − 1 are the real industrial energy price respec-
tively in countries i and j in sector s at time t− 1. A positive value of
epgapijst − 1 implies that the importer i has a higher industrial energy
price than the exporter. We lag prices by a year to reﬂect delayed
response and also mitigate contemporaneous feedback effects. The
primary objective of the study is to estimate the coefﬁcient β1.
The choice of control variables is derived from recent advances in the
gravity literature. First, we control for overall bilateral economic size,
relative economic size (similarity of GDP) as well as differences in rela-
tive factor endowments (similarity of capital–labour ratios) (Baltagi
et al., 2003; Egger, 2000; Wang et al., 2010). These three variables are
speciﬁed as follows:
gdpti jt ¼ ln GDPit þ GDP jt
 
gdpsimi jt ¼ ln 1− GDPitGDPit þ GDP jt
 2
−
GDP jt
GDPit þ GDP jt
 2" #
r f aci jt ¼ ln
GDPit
CAPITAit
 
− ln
GDPi j
GDPCAPITAjt
 
:
Overall bilateral economic size reﬂects the fact that the volume of
exports should be higher, the bigger the overall market size. gdpsimijt
measures the similarity in the levels of GDP in the trading partners,
hence captures the relative size of the two trading partners. Before the
log-linear transformation, this variable can take a value between 0 and
0.5. A higher value indicates that the two trading partners are similar
in size (GDP), with 0.5 indicating equal country size. Theory predicts
that the higher this value, the greater the expected share of inter-
industry trade (Egger, 2000). rfacijt measures the similarity in capital–7 Non-linear models initially developed for count data analysis can be successfully ap-
plied to continuous variables such as trade data (Wooldridge, 2010). Studies have shown
that log-linearisedmodels estimatedbyOLS can be inefﬁcient andbiasedwhere thedata is
heteroskedastic (Santos Silva and Tenreyro, 2006), as is often the case with bilateral trade
data.
8 http://www.cepii.fr/CEPII/en/bdd_modele/presentation.asp?id=1.
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of 0 represents equal factor endowment proportion. Bergstrand (1990)
illustrates empirically using the gravity model that bilateral trade be-
tween high income countries is positively related to similarity in rela-
tive factor endowments (reﬂecting similarity in preferences). In
addition, we control for two idiosyncratic factors thatmight be correlat-
edwith energy price differences: the country-pair-sector speciﬁc differ-
ence in wages and the country pair speciﬁc real effective exchange rate
ratio deﬁned as follows:
wagegapijst ¼ ln wageistð Þ− ln wagejst
 
reerratioi jt ¼ ln reeritð Þ− ln reer jt
 
where wageist and wagejst are the average real wage in countries i and j
in sector s in year t expressed in current USD and reerit and reerjt are the
real effective exchange rates in countries i and j at time t against the US
dollar. A positive value of wagegapijst implies that the importer i has a
higher real wage price than the exporter. The FDI and industry location
literature, as well as the trade literature have examined the role of la-
bour price differentials in international trade patterns and found
mixed evidence on their effect (Baltagi et al., 2007). Exchange rate dy-
namics have also been explored as a possible determinant of interna-
tional trade decisions Egger and Egger (2005).
As is common with trade data, the sectoral trade data used in this
analysis displays strong persistence. Thus it is important to account for
trade in past periods, by including lags of the dependent variable.
Lagged dependent variables enter as∑p = 1n importsijs(t − p), where n is
the number of lags. We experimented with different values of n and
use n=3 in our baseline speciﬁcation for the reason that the coefﬁcient
on the lagged dependent variables becomes statistically insigniﬁcant
from n = 4 onwards, but we test the sensitivity of our results to this
choice.
To minimise the possibility of biases due to omitted variables, our
model includes country-pair-sector ﬁxed effects ηijs, to control for time
invariant country pair-speciﬁc determinants (such as distance, common
language, common borders, common currency, colonial ties) but also
for sector speciﬁc characteristics such as product differentiation,market
structure, transportation costs and trade intensity.
2.3. Dynamic count data models with ﬁxed effects
Accounting both for dynamics and ﬁxed effects in count datamodels
raises a number of issues. Introducing lagged dependent variables vio-
lates the strict exogeneity assumption which makes the Hausman
et al. (1984) ﬁxed effectmethod (the count data equivalent to thewith-
in groups estimator) unsuitable as it requires strict exogeneity. To si-
multaneously account for ﬁxed effects and lagged dependent variables
we use the pre-sample mean count data estimator introduced by
Blundell et al. (1999) and Blundell et al. (2002), who suggest condition-
ing on the pre-sample average of the dependent variable to proxy out
the ﬁxed effect. Applications to environmental issues include Jug and
Mirza (2005) and Egger et al. (2011). The pre-sample mean estimator
requires long pre-sample history of realisations of the dependant vari-
able and is thus particularly suitable to the study of trade data. Because
the pre-sample average of the dependent variable may fail to capture
every aspect of time-invariant country-pair heterogeneity, we include
standard gravity variables (including the log of population-weighted
geographical distance, contiguity, common ofﬁcial language and com-
mon currency) as well as importer, exporter and sector dummy vari-
ables. The inclusion of this large set of dummy variables combined
with the skewed distribution of the dependent variable poses computa-
tional problems to which the Poisson pseudo-maximum likelihood
(PPML) estimator developed by Santos Silva and Tenreyro (2006) offers
an attractive solution. Santos Silva and Tenreyro (2006) show that the
model can provide a consistent estimator of bilateral trade in gravitymodels. However, we check the robustness of our results to the use of
alternative estimators (Section 4.4).
3. Data and descriptive statistics
3.1. Data
This paper brings together a variety of datasets to determine the im-
pact of relative energy prices on trade. Our panel covers 42 countries
(including high, middle and low income) and 62 sectors for the period
1996 to 2011. The data is disaggregated at 2-digit sector resolution
using SITC Revision 3 (See Table 7 in Appendix B for a list of countries
and sectors). The energy price data can only be disaggregated at a
broader level, and we have prices for 12 broad sectors incorporating
the 62 sectors at which the analysis is carried out.
3.1.1. Bilateral trade data
Bilateral trade data is taken from the CEPII's BACI database8 which
contains detailed bilateral import and export statistics from the UN
Commodity Trade (COMTRADE) database. Although the trade data is
available at a more granular level, the chosen level reﬂects a trade-off
between several considerations. A ﬁner level of sector disaggregation
can be advantageous particularly for heterogeneous sectors, enabling
to control for sub-sector speciﬁc characteristics. However, moving to
the three or four-digit level substantially increases the number of zero
ormissing values in the dependent variable and results in a very skewed
distribution. At 62 sector level, there are no observations with zero or
missing trade, and the share of observations where the trade in value
is very small (less than 0.01 million USD) is around 5%, which is man-
ageable for the estimation techniques used.
Depending on the year, the bilateral trade data in the sample covers
between 55 and 65% of world trade obtained from the WTO Statistics
Database (World Trade Organisation, 2012). Exports (in value terms)
on an aggregate level rose steadily during the 1990s decade from
$3515 billion USD in 1991 to $6494 billion in 2002. It then increased
at a faster rate until disrupted by theﬁnancial crisis and subsequent eco-
nomic recession in 2008, when world exports fell sharply (dropping
from $16,140 billion to $12,542 billion between 2008 and 2009). Since
2009, aggregate exports have been on an upward trend again, reaching
$18,255 billion in 2011.
3.1.2. Energy prices
We use a unique and comprehensive dataset of industrial energy
price indices at the country and sector levels covering 48 countries
and 12 industry sectors, constructed in Sato et al. (2015). This sector
level energy price index covers four key types of fuel carriers (electricity,
gas, coal and oil), provides greater coverage of sectors, countries and
years than previously available energy price data. The energy price
index for a given sector s in country i in year t is constructed by
weighting fuel prices for four carriers (oil, gas, coal and electricity) by
the consumption of each fuel type in that sector–country (si) (see
Appendix A for more detail on the construction of the price index).
This method addresses the important issue of heterogenous fuel mix
observed across sectors and countries and the index hence captures
the change in energy price level (including taxes) over time for a specif-
ic country-sector. This is useful because data on energy prices faced by
different industrial sectors are hard to obtain for most countries, whilst
energy price for electricity generation and households are readily avail-
able. For most OECD countries, industrial energy prices are published
only at the country level (averaged across all industrial sectors) rather
than for individual sectors, and often with considerable missing data
points. The energy price index uses ﬁxed fuel weights (representing
fuel consumption in 2005) over time and hence captures the within-
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missing data-points as documented in Sato et al. (2015). The fuel prices
are transformed into logs before applying the fuel weights hence the
resulting energy price index is not expressed in monetary units.9 A ver-
sion of the energy price in USD/TOE terms using time-varying fuel
weights – hence corresponding to observed energy prices faced by in-
dustry – also available from Sato et al. (2015) is shown in Fig. 1.
The price index uses industrial energy price data from the IEA Energy
End-use Prices database (IEA, 2012a) as the primary source of fuel price
data for the industrial sectors. This represents theﬁnal industrial energy
prices including taxes paid by the industry for different fuels and ex-
cluding VAT and recoverable taxes and levies and is expressed in real
terms (underlying prices are net of inﬂation).10 The sector level fuel
consumption data is taken from the IEA World Energy Balances (IEA,
2012a). It is important to note that this industrial energy price index
represents an approximation of the true prices paid by each sector
and may not be the true prices, for example because some countries
offer tax exemptions and other subsidies to energy users. However, in
the absence of comprehensive data on observed energy price data at
the sector level, it provides a good alternative solution.
There has historically been considerable variation in industrial ener-
gy prices across countries as shown in Fig. 1. In 2001, prices were below
600US$/TOE in the USA, South Korea, India, Indonesia and France, but
were twice as high in Italy and Japan. Whilst real industrial energy
prices remained relatively unchanged over the next decade (below
800US$/TOW in 2008) for Canada, South Korea, USA, India and
Indonesia, in contrast, prices tended to rise for Italy, France, Mexico,
Brazil and Japan. As a consequence, there has been considerable varia-
tion across time in energy price differences that we can exploit in our
empirical setting.
3.1.3. Other data
GDP and population data are obtained form the International Mone-
tary Fund'sWorld Economic Outlook (IMF, 2012).11 GDP data are avail-
able in US$ in current prices. These are converted into real prices using
the GDP deﬂator index, which is also available from the same database.
Because the latter has different base years for different countries,we ad-
just the deﬂator index, using 2005 as the baseline for all countries.
Data on wages were obtained from United Nations Industrial
Development Organization (2011). It was constructed by deﬂating
nominal annual wage by sector using a GDP deﬂator variable from the
World Bank, then converting to constant US dollars (2005) using ex-
change rate data from UNIDO. Data on the real effective exchange
rates (reer) are taken from Darvas (2012). Finally, standard gravity
model variables are obtained from the Gravity Dataset provided by
CEPII (2012).
3.2. Descriptive statistics
Descriptive statistics for our estimation sample are provided in
Table 1. At the country-pair-sector level, there is considerable variation
in exports as shown in the ﬁrst row. With a mean of $112 million,9 It is important for econometric analysis to keep the weights ﬁxed so that the only var-
iation in the price variable comes from underlying variations in energy prices. This makes
the interpretation of the coefﬁcient straightforward and prevents some potential
endogeneity issues. The results are robust however to using time-varying weights (see
Section 4.4).
10 The IEA deﬁnes the published industrial energy prices as “the average of amounts paid
for the industrial and manufacturing sectors” and “include transport costs to the consum-
er; are prices actually paid (i.e., net of rebates) and; include taxeswhich have to be paid by
the consumer as part of the transaction andwhich are not refundable. This excludes value
added tax (VAT) paid in many European countries by industry (including electric power
stations) and commercial end-users for all goods and services (including energy). In these
cases VAT is refunded to the customer, usually in the form of a tax credit. Therefore, it is
not included in the prices and taxes columns in the tables.” (IEA, 2012b).
11 For Taiwan, GDP datawas obtained fromTaiwan national statistics (National Statistics
of Republic of China (Taiwan), 2012).bilateral exports at the sector level range from zero up to over $97
billion. More variation comes from the sector heterogeneity
(in trade intensity and value) than from the bilateral-pair
heterogeneity.
The variation in the energy price gap variable is higher between
groups than within. The mean is zero because of the symmetrical na-
ture of the data — the energy price gap between the US and the UK is
expressed as a negative value when considering UK imports to the
US, and as a positive value of the same magnitude when considering
US imports to the UK. Thewithin-group standard deviation of the en-
ergy price ratio suggests there have been historical ﬂuctuations in
the energy price gap, due not to climate policies but to underlying
factors (e.g., energy taxes, energy supply and demand), have been
considerable. Table 1 shows that the between country-pair-sector
variation is greater than the within variation for all variables,
highlighting the importance of using panel data to control for het-
erogeneity across country-pairs and sectors.
4. Regression results
4.1. All sectors
Table 2 presents our main estimation results. We construct the pre-
sample mean of the dependent variable over the years 1996 to 200012
and estimate over the period 2001–2011 using the Poisson pseudo-
maximum likelihood.
Column (1) shows that the coefﬁcient on the lagged (tax inclusive)
energy price gap is positive and signiﬁcant. This result is robust to con-
trolling for thewage difference between countries i and j (column2), for
the exchange rate (column 3), and for both (column 4). The elasticity of
0.021 implies that a 10% higher energy price gap is associated with
about 0.21% more imports. Most of the control variables have signs
that are consistent with expectations. We ﬁnd that the use of a dynamic
panel estimator is important, as the coefﬁcients for the lagged depen-
dent variables always exhibit a parameter estimate which is signiﬁcant-
ly different from zero. This suggests that there is indeed strong ‘think-
back’ or ‘stickiness’ in the level of sectoral trade between two countries
as found in recent literature (Olivero and Yotov, 2010, 2012). When
controlling for wage differences and the exchange rates (column 4), in-
creases in total economic mass increases bilateral exports, and the sim-
ilarity in GDP also tends to increase trade. The positive coefﬁcient on the
latter suggests existence of intra-industry trade, although the coefﬁ-
cients are not statistically signiﬁcant. The coefﬁcient on rfacijt is nega-
tive, suggesting that bilateral trade is negatively related to differences
in relative factor endowments, in line with the Linder hypothesis. The
real exchange rate ratio is positive and signiﬁcant, suggesting that real
exchange rate dynamics is an important determinant of bilateral trade
ﬂows. The coefﬁcient on the wage gap is not statistically different
from zero. At least two reasons can explain this surprising ﬁnding.
First, the wage data is only available at a broad sectoral aggregation
level (22 sectors) and the resulting measurement error should lead to
attenuation bias, which may explain why the point estimate is so close
to zero. Secondly, we already control for relative factor endowment (de-
ﬁned as theGDPper capita differential), and this variable is likely to cap-
ture part of the variation in wages.
In summary, the results from Table 2 offer support to the hypothesis
that the energy price gap has a positive and signiﬁcant effect on bilateral
trade. In other words, imports in sector s increase in response to the rise
in energy prices in the importing country relative to the exporting12 Using 5 years of data to construct the pre-sample mean is arbitrary and driven by a
trade-off between the length of the pre-sample period and the size of the estimation sam-
ple. On the one hand, onewoulduse asmany years as possible to construct the pre-sample
average. On the other hand, as the trade data only starts in 2005, any additional year used
to construct the pre-sample average mechanically reduces the size of our estimation sam-
ple.We tested the sensitivity of our results to using a pre-sample period of 4, 5 and 6 years,
and ﬁnd that this makes almost no change to the results.
13 Ideally, one would want to collect data on the energy intensity of sectors, interact the
energy intensity variablewith the energy price variable and directly look at the coefﬁcient
obtained for the interaction term, which measures how the impact of the energy price
varies according to the energy intensity of the sector. The quality of the data is not as good
as one would hope, however, for two reasons: ﬁrst, the RUEC data is only available at a
broad level of sector disaggregation (14 sectors, compared to the 60+ sectors that we
have in our sample) and secondly, the variation in energy costs is partly driven by changes
in energy prices, which raises endogeneity concerns, when one wouldwant to use energy
intensity. When we include real unit energy costs (grouping sectors into 14 groups) as
well as an interaction term between energy prices and unit energy costs in our baseline
model, we ﬁnd that the RUEC term enters as positive and highly signiﬁcant, with a value
0.0045*** (p-value= 0.000). The coefﬁcient on the energy price gap is 0.016***. The inter-
action term has a positive sign (0.00048) but is not statistically signiﬁcant (p-value =
0.129). These results go in the expected direction, but the lack of variation and the fact that
energy prices enter into the construction of the energy costs can explain the lack of clear
statistical signiﬁcance. We have unfortunately not been able to obtain better, more disag-
gregated sector energy intensity data to improve this estimation. This data gap is a preva-
lent problem in the literature as discussed in Upadhyaya (2010). Other papers have used
electricity intensity of sectors to proxy for energy intensity but this method is unsuitable
for this analysis, as the energy price variable we use accounts for all major fuel types
and not only electricity.
Fig. 1. Cross-country differences in the energy prices (including tax) for average industry, for 10 sample countries. Note: The panels show the country level variableweights price level (in
2010$) based on market exchange rates. BRA = Brazil, CAN= Canada, FRA= France, IDN = Indonesia, IND = India, ITA = Italy, JPN = Japan, KOR= South Korea and MEX=Mexico.
Source: Sato et al. (2015).
Table 1
Descriptive statistics.
Overall Between Within
Mean SD Min Max SD Min Max SD Min Max
importsijst 106.726 720.863 0.001 97,522.294 624.083 0.001 50,421.11 210.041 −24,169.84 47,270.91
epgapijst − 1 −0.005 0.623 −2.505 2.505 0.624 −2.504 2.504 0.141 −0.785 0.791
wagegapijst − 1 −0.039 1.838 −7.459 8.909 1.823 −6.294 8.741 0.127 −3.239 3.259
reerratioijst − 1 −0.001 0.157 −0.742 0.742 0.128 0.630 0.742 0.096 0.481 0.557
gdptijt − 1 9.203 2.439 3.571 14.934 2.475 3.597 14.847 0.085 8.839 9.586
gdpsimijt − 1 −2.414 2.005 −11.135 −0.693 2.006 −11.135 −0.693 0.052 −2.921 −2.217
rfacijt − 1 2.097 2.007 0.0006 9.602 1.935 0.004 9.576 0.063 1.797 2.462
Notes: These are the values from our regression sample of 348,771 observations across 64,763 country pair sectors, between 2001 and 2011.
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in the importer's energy price relative to the exporter is associatedwith
a 0.2% increase in imports. Thus, this effect is statistically signiﬁcant but
very small. We return to this point in Section 4.3.
4.2. Examining sector heterogeneity
The results presented in Section 4.1 present the average impact of
energy price differences on imports across all sectors. However, it is
likely that this impact differs across sectors depending on their energy
intensity. The importance of sector heterogeneity in the trade impacts
of carbon pricing has been explored in partial equilibrium modelling
for Europe's heavy industry, as well as in econometric analysis for the
EU production sectors (Demailly and Quirion, 2008). This section exam-
ines whether similar evidence can be found for a wider geographical
scope, taking advantage of the fact that our energy price variable
epgapijst captures variations in energy prices not only across country-
pairs but also across sectors. In order to explore the heterogeneity of
the impact of energy prices on imports we run the model separately
for energy intensive and non-energy intensive sectors. We divided the
sectors into energy intensive and non-energy intensive using data on
real unit energy costs (RUEC) from the EU27 group in 2009 (European
Commission, 2014), deﬁned as the ratio of energy costs over value
added. Energy intensive sectors are those whose ratio of energy costs
over value added exceeds 10%. The list of sectors considered as
energy-intensive and non-energy intensive is available in Table 8 in
Appendix B.
The results of our estimations are presented in Table 3. The results
give support to the notion that the impacts of the energy price gap on
trade are heterogeneous across sectors depending on their energyintensity. The coefﬁcient is positive and statistically signiﬁcant for
both energy-intensive and non-energy intensive sectors.
However, the effect is larger for energy-intensive sectors with an
elasticity of 0.024. This is around 50% higher than in non-energy inten-
sive sectors (0.017) and larger than the average impact uncovered in
Section 4.1 but still fairly small.134.3. Magnitude of the effect
To obtain a better sense of the magnitude of the results, in this sec-
tion we investigate how much of the overall variation in sectoral
Table 3
Results by sector groups.
(1) (2)
Energy intensive
industry
Non-energy intensive
industry
Energy price gap 0.024⁎⁎ 0.017⁎⁎⁎
(0.011) (0.006)
Control variables
Wage gap 0.023 −0.028⁎⁎
(0.019) (0.012)
Real eff. ex rate ratio 0.014 0.127⁎⁎⁎
(0.051) (0.028)
Relative fact. endow. −0.001 −0.007⁎⁎⁎
(0.004) (0.003)
GDP total 0.382⁎⁎ 0.176⁎⁎
(0.163) (0.085)
GDP similarity 0.193⁎⁎ 0.081⁎
(0.081) (0.042)
Gravity variables
Distance −0.014⁎ −0.024⁎⁎⁎
(0.008) (0.004)
Common currency 0.021 −0.013
(0.016) (0.008)
Contiguity 0.015 −0.016⁎⁎⁎
(0.010) (0.006)
Common ofﬁcial lang. −0.017 0.023⁎⁎⁎
(0.014) (0.008)
Lagged dep. vars.
Tradeijt − 1 0.826⁎⁎⁎ 0.905⁎⁎⁎
(0.031) (0.013)
Tradeijt − 2 0.116⁎⁎⁎ 0.007
(0.029) (0.018)
Tradeijt − 3 0.029⁎ 0.040⁎⁎⁎
(0.018) (0.012)
Country-pair sect. FE Presamp Presamp
Importer and exporter dum. Yes Yes
Sector dummies Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes
Observations 63,477 166,003
Notes: Standard errors clustered at the country pair level are in parentheses. The depen-
dent variable is the value of annual bilateral imports. Estimation is by Poisson pseudo-
maximum likelihood. The country-pair-sector ﬁxed effect is a pre-sample mean of the de-
pendent variable over the years 1996–2000. All regressions include controls for wage dif-
ferences, real effective exchange rate ratio, relative factor endowments, overall economic
size of the two trading partners, GDP similarity, population weighted distance between
trading partners, and dummies for common currency, contiguity and common ofﬁcial lan-
guage. All regressions include dummies for years, importer, exporter and sectors.
⁎ Signiﬁcant at 10%.
⁎⁎ Signiﬁcant at 5%.
⁎⁎⁎ Signiﬁcant at 1%.
Table 2
Results for all sectors.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Energy price gap 0.011⁎ 0.011⁎⁎ 0.021⁎⁎⁎ 0.021⁎⁎⁎
(0.006) (0.006) (0.005) (0.006)
Control variables
Wage gap 0.014 0.001
(0.009) (0.009)
Real eff. ex rate ratio 0.053⁎⁎ 0.053⁎⁎
(0.025) (0.027)
Relative fact. endow. −0.007⁎⁎⁎ −0.007⁎⁎⁎ −0.003 −0.003
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
GDP total −0.262⁎⁎⁎ −0.168⁎ 0.114 0.114
(0.089) (0.095) (0.075) (0.096)
GDP similarity −0.135⁎⁎⁎ −0.088⁎ 0.053 0.053
(0.045) (0.047) (0.038) (0.048)
Gravity variables
Distance −0.012⁎⁎⁎ −0.011⁎⁎⁎ −0.019⁎⁎⁎ −0.018⁎⁎
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.007)
Common currency −0.004 −0.003 −0.008 −0.006
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.016)
Contiguity 0.006 0.007 −0.003 0.018⁎
(0.006) (0.006) (0.005) (0.010)
Common ofﬁcial lang. 0.005 0.004 0.009 0.002
(0.007) (0.007) (0.006) (0.012)
Lagged dep. vars.
Tradeijt − 1 0.899⁎⁎⁎ 0.895⁎⁎⁎ 0.880⁎⁎⁎ 0.860⁎⁎⁎
(0.009) (0.009) (0.010) (0.015)
Tradeijt − 2 0.051⁎⁎⁎ 0.054⁎⁎⁎ 0.058⁎⁎⁎ 0.074⁎⁎⁎
(0.011) (0.011) (0.013) (0.020)
Tradeijt − 3 0.036⁎⁎⁎ 0.035⁎⁎⁎ 0.041⁎⁎⁎ 0.055⁎⁎⁎
(0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.015)
Country-pair sect. FE Presamp Presamp Presamp Presamp
Importer and exporter dum. Yes Yes Yes Yes
Sector ﬁxed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 333,055 329,873 317,469 317,382
Notes: Standard errors clustered at the country pair level are in parentheses. The depen-
dent variable is the value of annual bilateral imports in all columns. Estimation is by
Poisson pseudo-maximum likelihood. The country-pair-sector ﬁxed effect is a pre-sample
mean of the dependent variable over the years 1996–2000. All regressions include con-
trols for relative factor endowments, overall economic size of the two trading partners,
GDP similarity, populationweighted distance between the trading partners, and dummies
for common currency, contiguity and common ofﬁcial language. All regressions include
dummies for years, importer, exporter, and sectors. Columns (2) and (4) also control for
wage differences, and columns (3) and (4) control for the real effective exchange rate
ratio (reer).
⁎ Signiﬁcant at 10%.
⁎⁎ Signiﬁcant at 5%.
⁎⁎⁎ Signiﬁcant at 1%.
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simple example. Between 2005 and 2006, India's iron and steel sector's
real energy price index increased from 5.03 to 5.09. Over the same peri-
od, the real energy price index for the same sector in the UK increased
from 5.61 to 5.71. This implies that over this period the energy price
gap between the UK and India's steel sector increased by 4%.14
In Section 4.2 we found that a 1% increase in the energy price gap in
the heavy industry sector was associated with a 0.027% increase in im-
ports. Thus a 4% increase in the price gap between the UK and India is
predicted to increaseUK's imports in this sector by around0.1%. Howev-
er during the same period, India's iron and steel exports to the UK actu-
ally grew by 33%. The energy price gap is therefore explaining 0.3% of
the observed change in trade volumes.
This example illustrates the small contribution of the variation in en-
ergy prices in the overall variation in trade ﬂows in the iron and steel
sector. We now generalise this example and analyse the contribution
of energy price changes to the overall variance in bilateral trade ﬂows14 exp(5.71 5.61)/exp(5.09 5.03) = 1.04. Recall that the energy price gap is deﬁned as
epgapijst ¼ lnðEPistÞ− lnðEP jstÞ ¼ lnðEPistEP jstÞ.for the two broad sector categories — heavy- and light-industry. To do
so we calculate the change in trade ﬂows predicted by our model and
compare this to the observed change in trade ﬂow for each observation
in our sample. The contribution of energy prices to the variance of trade
ﬂows across these sectors is extremely small — around 0.01% for the
heavy industry sectors, and even smaller for light industry. This is also
clear from the observation that for any particular sector, the country
with the lowest energy price among all those trading with that country
is not always a net importer. Therefore, energy prices do not appear to
be amajor determinant of trade patterns. This shows that other explan-
atory factors, such as underlying trends in transport costs, globalisation
and supply chain integration, population growth and economic growth
play amuchmore important role in the variation in trade over time than
do energy costs.4.4. Robustness checks
We conducted a large number of robustness checks and report the
main ones below.
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As explained in Section 2.3, the pre-sample mean Poisson pseudo-
maximum likelihood estimator is our preferred estimator, as it is able
to address the key characteristics of the data — the combination of
ﬁxed effects with lagged dependent variables, the skewed distribution
of the dependent variable and the large number of dummy variables.
However, we also analyse the sensitivity of our results to the use of al-
ternative models, in line with the recent gravity model trade literature
(Gómez-Herrera, 2013). In column (2) of Table 4, we use the Hausman,
Hall and Griliches (HHG) method to account for country-pair-sector
ﬁxed effects, even though the assumption of strict exogeneity underly-
ing HHG is problematic in our context, as we have a highly dynamic
speciﬁcation. The coefﬁcient is still highly statistically signiﬁcant and
higher than that in our baseline model. In column (3), we reproduce
the same speciﬁcation as in column (4) of Table 2 (also reproduced in
column (1) of Table 4) but use a negative binomial estimator instead,
whichmight be better able to handle the large overdispersion of the de-
pendent variable. The coefﬁcient is smaller but in line with our baseline
model.Table 4
Sensitivity analysis results 1.
Baseline model Alternative model
(1) (2) (3)
Poisson HHG Negative bino
Energy price gap 0.021⁎⁎⁎ 0.055⁎⁎⁎ 0.012⁎
(0.006) (0.014) (0.007)
Control variables
Wage gap 0.001 −0.016 0.000
(0.009) (0.020) (0.000)
Real effective exchange rate ratio 0.053⁎⁎ 0.077⁎⁎ 0.142⁎⁎⁎
(0.027) (0.038) (0.028)
Relative factor endowments −0.003 −0.057 −0.007⁎⁎⁎
(0.002) (0.061) (0.003)
GDP total 0.114 0.800⁎⁎⁎ 0.176⁎⁎
(0.096) (0.085) (0.085)
GDP similarity 0.053 0.162⁎ 0.081⁎
(0.048) (0.090) (0.042)
Gravity variables
Distance −0.018⁎⁎ −0.063⁎⁎⁎
(0.007) (0.007)
Common currency −0.006 −0.007
(0.016) (0.012)
Contiguity 0.018⁎ −0.024⁎
(0.010) (0.013)
Common ofﬁcial language 0.002 0.002
(0.012) (0.013)
Lagged dependent variables
Tradeijt − 1 0.860⁎⁎⁎ 0.598⁎⁎⁎ 0.856⁎⁎⁎
(0.015) (0.012) (0.016)
Tradeijt − 2 0.074⁎⁎⁎ 0.010 0.100⁎⁎⁎
(0.020) (0.013) (0.017)
Tradeijt − 3 0.055⁎⁎⁎ 0.005 0.051⁎⁎⁎
(0.015) (0.009) (0.012)
Tradeijt − 4
Country-pair sect. FE Presamp Yes Presamp
Importer and exporter dum. Yes No Yes
Imp-yr, exp-year dum. No No No
Sector ﬁxed effects Yes No Yes
Observations 317,382 309,085 329,873
Notes: The dependent variable is the annual bilateral imports expressed in value terms. Standar
two exceptions. Column (2) uses Poisson ﬁxed effects and column (3) uses negative binomial. A
ative factor endowments, overall economic size of the two trading partners and GDP similarit
weighted distance between the trading partners, and dummies for common currency, contiguit
other columns use a pre-samplemean. All regressions include year dummies, except column (4
and sectors dummies are included in all columns other than (2) and (4).
⁎ Signiﬁcant at 10%.
⁎⁎ Signiﬁcant at 5%.
⁎⁎⁎ Signiﬁcant at 1%.4.4.2. Fixed effects speciﬁcation
Baltagi et al. (2003) experiment with eight different ﬁxed effects
models and show the importance of controlling for a full interaction of
importer-time and exporter-time ﬁxed effects to analyse bilateral
trade ﬂows and thus purge the estimates from a large number of possi-
ble confounding factors. In column (4), importer by year and exporter
by year ﬁxed effects αit and αjt are included to control for commonmac-
roeconomic shocks at the country level, such as the sharp fall in global
trade volumes following theﬁnancial crisis in 2008whichmay have dif-
ferently affected countries around the world. We ﬁnd that the coefﬁ-
cient is smaller than the baseline speciﬁcation, suggesting that if
anything the already small elasticity of trade to energy prices might
even be slightly overestimated.
4.4.3. Energy price changes in third countries
From a general equilibrium point of view, trade between i and j
might also be affected by changes in prices in other countries k.
Indeed, a change in energy prices in country k will indirectly affect
trade between i and j through a redirection of trade between i and kAlternative ﬁxed effects LDV selection
(4) (5) (6) (7)
mial Poisson Poisson Poisson Poisson
0.011⁎⁎ 0.020⁎⁎⁎ 0.020⁎⁎⁎ 0.021⁎⁎⁎
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
0.008 0.006 0.002 0.001
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008)
−0.220⁎⁎⁎ 0.040 0.049⁎ 0.053⁎⁎
(0.073) (0.026) (0.025) (0.025)
−0.002 −0.003 −0.003 −0.003
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
−0.035⁎⁎ 0.215⁎⁎⁎ 0.157⁎⁎ 0.112
(0.016) (0.070) (0.072) (0.074)
−0.022⁎⁎⁎ 0.104⁎⁎⁎ 0.074⁎⁎ 0.052
(0.008) (0.035) (0.036) (0.037)
−0.021⁎⁎⁎ −0.021⁎⁎⁎ −0.020⁎⁎⁎ −0.019⁎⁎⁎
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
−0.008 −0.011 −0.008 −0.008
(0.008) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009)
−0.006 −0.005 −0.003 −0.003
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
0.007 0.011 0.009 0.009
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
0.881⁎⁎⁎ 0.947⁎⁎⁎ 0.881⁎⁎⁎ 0.879⁎⁎⁎
(0.009) (0.006) (0.009) (0.010)
0.060⁎⁎⁎ 0.088⁎⁎⁎ 0.059⁎⁎⁎
(0.012) (0.011) (0.012)
0.046⁎⁎⁎ 0.042⁎⁎⁎
(0.009) (0.009)
−0.002
(0.008)
Presamp Presamp Presamp Presamp
No Yes Yes Yes
Yes No No No
No Yes Yes Yes
317,382 317,382 317,382 312,588
d errors clustered at the country pair level are in parentheses. Estimation is by PPML, with
ll regressions include controls for wage differences, real effective exchange rate ratio, rel-
y. Gravity variables are included in all columns except (2), which include the population
y and common ofﬁcial language. Column (2) uses country-pair-sector ﬁxed effects, whilst
) which uses importer-year and exporter-year dummies. Importer and exporter dummies
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with other countries. The inclusion of importer-by-year and exporter-
by-year ﬁxed effects reported above would control for this issue to a
large extent, but in order to directly control for changes in relative prices
with other trading partners,we include a variable thatmeasures, for any
country-pair i and j, sector s and time t, the energy price gap between
country i and all countries k other than j. We construct the average
price gap between i and third countries k byweighing the price in coun-
try k by the value of imports by i from k in year t− 1 (to capture the idea
that substitution ismore likely to occurwith countries that already have
a trade relationship with i). We report the results of this test in column
(7) of Table 5. The price gap with third countries enters with a negative
but not signiﬁcant coefﬁcient. Importantly, ourmain variable of interest,
the price gap variable, remains highly statistically signiﬁcant with a
point estimate of 0.019. This suggests that not controlling for energy
price changes in third countries might actually bias the coefﬁcient
downward.Table 5
Sensitivity analysis results 2.
Alternative energy price
2000 ﬁxed
weights
2010 ﬁxed
weights
Variable
weights
(1) (2) (3)
Poisson Poisson Poisson
Energy price gap 0.015⁎⁎ 0.020⁎⁎⁎ 0.017⁎⁎
(0.006) (0.006) (0.008)
Control variables
Epgap in 3rd countries
Wage gap −0.002 −0.002 −0.003
(0.009) (0.009) (0.01)
Real effective exchange rate
ratio
0.051⁎ 0.053⁎⁎ 0.03
(0.027) (0.027) (0.03)
Relative factor endowments −0.003 −0.003 −0.005⁎
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
GDP total 0.081 0.112 0.013
(0.101) (0.097) (0.118)
GDP similarity 0.037 0.052 0.001
(0.051) (0.048) (0.059)
Gravity variables
Distance −0.018⁎⁎⁎ −0.020⁎⁎⁎ −0.016⁎⁎⁎
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Common currency −0.007 −0.009 0
(0.008) (0.009) (0.008)
Contiguity −0.002 −0.003 −0.006
(0.006) (0.006) (0.007)
Common ofﬁcial language 0.009 0.009 0.014⁎
(0.007) (0.007) (0.008)
Lagged dependent variables
Tradeijt − 1 0.878⁎⁎⁎ 0.880⁎⁎⁎ 0.893⁎⁎⁎
(0.010) (0.010) (0.011)
Tradeijt − 2 0.058⁎⁎⁎ 0.058⁎⁎⁎ 0.049⁎⁎⁎
(0.012) (0.012) (0.013)
Tradeijt − 3 0.043⁎⁎⁎ 0.041⁎⁎⁎ 0.036⁎⁎⁎
(0.009) (0.009) (0.01)
Country-pair sect. FE Presamp Presamp Presamp
Importer and exporter dum. Yes Yes Yes
Imp-yr, exp-year dum. No No No
Sector ﬁxed effects Yes Yes Yes
Observations 310,650 317,067 203,707
Notes: The dependent variable is the annual bilateral imports expressed in value terms. Standa
regressions include controls for wage differences, real effective exchange rate ratio, relative fa
dummies, the population weighted distance between the trading partners, and dummies for
dummies, importer and exporter dummies and sector dummies.
⁎ Signiﬁcant at 10%.
⁎⁎ Signiﬁcant at 5%.
⁎⁎⁎ Signiﬁcant at 1%.4.4.4. Lagged dependent variable selection
As explained in Section 2.1, we experimented with various dynamic
speciﬁcations. Columns (5), (6) and (7) in Table 4 show the results of
our baseline speciﬁcation when including respectively one, two and
four lags of the dependent variable. The results are remarkably stable
across these various speciﬁcations.
4.4.5. Speciﬁcation of the energy price gap
To test the possibility that the estimated effects are sensitive to the
speciﬁcation of the energy price gap variable, we used different time pe-
riods to construct the energy mix weights underlying the variable. We
use weights based on a pre-sample period in Table 5 column (1) and
weights based on 2010 in column (2). None of these variants of the
price variable change the results substantially.We also run the regression
with the energy price index which uses time-varying weights, rather
than ﬁxed weights, as shown in column (3). An advantage of ﬁxing the
weights for the entire period is that all the variation in the price gapLag selection Additional energy price
gap
Contemporaneous First lag
(baseline)
Second
lag
(4) (5) (6) (7)
Poisson Poisson Poisson Poisson
0.013⁎⁎ 0.021⁎⁎⁎ 0.008 0.019⁎⁎⁎
(0.006) (0.006) (0.005) (0.006)
−0.006
(0.005)
0.013 0.001 0.010 −0.005
(0.010) (0.009) (0.008) (0.007)
0.087⁎⁎⁎ 0.053⁎⁎ 0.031 0.070⁎⁎⁎
(0.028) (0.027) (0.026) (0.021)
−0.006⁎⁎⁎ −0.003 −0.007⁎⁎⁎ −0.003
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
−0.087 0.114 −0.300⁎⁎⁎ 0.111
(0.094) (0.096) (0.079) (0.084)
−0.047 0.053 −0.153⁎⁎⁎ 0.052
(0.047) (0.048) (0.040) (0.042)
−0.012⁎⁎⁎ −0.018⁎⁎ −0.004 −0.018⁎⁎⁎
(0.004) (0.007) (0.004) (0.004)
−0.005 −0.006 0.008 −0.006
(0.008) (0.016) (0.008) (0.008)
0.006 0.018⁎ 0.011⁎ −0.002
(0.006) (0.010) (0.006) (0.006)
0.006 0.002 0.003 0.012
(0.007) (0.012) (0.007) (0.007)
0.898⁎⁎⁎ 0.860⁎⁎⁎ 0.902⁎⁎⁎ 0.850⁎⁎⁎
(0.009) (0.015) (0.010) (0.011)
0.047⁎⁎⁎ 0.074⁎⁎⁎ 0.046⁎⁎⁎ 0.083⁎⁎⁎
(0.010) (0.020) (0.012) (0.015)
0.038⁎⁎⁎ 0.055⁎⁎⁎ 0.035⁎⁎⁎ 0.042⁎⁎⁎
(0.008) (0.015) (0.009) (0.010)
Presamp Presamp Presamp Presamp
Yes Yes Yes Yes
No No No No
Yes Yes Yes Yes
348,771 317,382 229,962 374,976
rd errors clustered at the country pair level are in parentheses. Estimation is by PPML. All
ctor endowments, overall economic size of the two trading partners, GDP similarity, year
common currency, contiguity and common ofﬁcial language. All regressions include year
Table 6
Predicted impact of EU ETS carbon prices on EU imports and exports.
Change in EU energy
prices
Implied change in
carbon price
Impact on
imports
Impact on
exports
+10% +€25 to 50/tCO2 +0.04% −0.2%
+30% +€50 to 100/tCO2 +0.07% −0.5%
S139M. Sato, A. Dechezleprêtre / Energy Economics 52 (2015) S130–S141variable comes from changes in energy prices and not from changes in
the energy mix, which makes the interpretation of the results more
straightforward. However, this abstracts from the fact that companies
may react to changes in energy prices by changing the energy mix they
use. When we construct the energy price variable using time-varying
weights, the results still hold and the coefﬁcient on the energy price
gap is slightly smaller (0.0169**) than in the reference model. This sug-
gests that sectors indeed switch towards cheaper fuels over time.
4.4.6. Energy price dynamics
Table 5 reports alternative dynamic speciﬁcations for the energy price
gap variable. We use energy prices dated in the current year in column
(4), lagged one year in our (baseline) of column (5) and lagged two
years in column (6). Using contemporaneous prices returns very similar
results to the lagged price, but the coefﬁcient on energy prices in year
t-2 is not statistically signiﬁcant. This suggests that trade responds fairly
quickly to relative energy prices but takes around a year for the full
effect to occur.
5. Simulating the trade impacts of carbon pricing policies
In this sectionwe explore the implications of our econometric models
for the evolution of future trade ﬂows and how these may be affected by
asymmetric changes in the price of energy implied by unequal carbon
pricing policies. Few meaningful carbon prices were in place during the
time period covered in the data, so that energy price variations have
thus far beenmostly driven by factors other than climate policies. Howev-
er, it is likely that the threats posed by climate changewill require carbon
emission regulations that lie far outside the bounds of past experience. For
example, as part of the “2030 framework for climate and energy policies”,
the European Union has committed itself to reduce its greenhouse gas
emissions by at least 40% in 2030 compared to 1990. The “Roadmap for
moving to a low-carbon economy” further suggests that, by 2050, the
EU should cut its emissions to 80% below 1990 levels.
Large industrial energy users in the EU have been regulated under
the EU Emissions Trading System since 2005. During the period
2005–2011, the average carbon price was around €14.5/tCO2.15 The
40% greenhouse gas emission reduction target for 2030 implies consid-
erably higher prices on the European carbon market than the ones ob-
served to date. According to Thomson Reuters Point Carbon, the price
of carbon should reach €65/tCO2 in 2030, which corresponds to a €50/
tCO2 increase from the average 2005–2011 level. Further carbon emis-
sion reductions in line with the 2050 targets are likely to push the
price up above the €100/tCO2 level. Given the large uncertainty around
the energy price increase from carbon pricing, we simulate two scenar-
ios whereby energy prices were 10% and 30% higher throughout Europe
than those actually observed. This implies that the average EU ETS car-
bon price would have been higher by €25–50/tCO2 for the 10% energy
price increase scenario, and by €50–100/tCO2 for the 30% scenario, as-
suming no free allowance allocation (thus the EU sectors face the full
impact of carbon pricing) according to a recent study by the UK Depart-
ment of Energy and Climate Change16 (UK Department of Energy and15 The average annual EUA price in Phase I was €22.3/tCO2e (2005), €15.1/tCO2e (2006),
€1.3/tCO2e (2007), and €15.5/tCO2 in Phase II (2008–2012).
16 The study conducted by the UK Department of Energy and Climate Change estimates
that the average impact of all energy and climate change policies on business energy (gas
& electricity) bills, including UK policies and the EU ETS, compared with bills in the ab-
sence of policies for large energy intensive users is between 6–36% assuming a 30GBP/
tCO2 EU ETS price in 2020 (DECC, 2011). Energy price impacts are likely to vary consider-
ably according to the energy proﬁle of users (e.g., gas intensive or electricity intensive) as
well asmodel assumptions. Of this estimated range of impacts, a third is attributable to the
EU ETS, and two thirds to other climate policies such as the Renewables Obligations sup-
port costs. Hence the energy price increase attributable to the EU ETS with 30GBP/tCO2 is
between 2–12% compared to the case with no EU ETS. Using average exchange rate be-
tween 2005–2011, 30GBP/tCO2 is approximated at €35/tCO2. Instead with a carbon price
assumption of 70GBP/tCO2, the same study predicts industry energy price rise of between
13–60%, the third of which is attributable to the EU ETS (4–20%).Climate Change, 2011). Using our econometric model, we simulate the
impact of a 10% and a 30% increase in energy prices across Europe on
the EU's imports and exports, assuming no change in energy prices in
the rest of the world. Applying this range of energy price increases in-
duces a signiﬁcant change in the size of the energy price gap between
the EU and its trading partners. Table 6 presents the predicted impacts
on Europe's imports and exports.17 EU imports are predicted to increase
by 0.04% following a 10% increase in energy prices (corresponding to a
€40–65 /tCO2 price) and by 0.07% following a 30% increase in energy
prices (corresponding to a €65–115/tCO2 price). Exports are predicted
to decline by 0.2% to 0.5%.18 To put things into perspective, consider
that imports to European countries have grown at an average annual
rate of 6.5% between 1995 and 2011 and at a rate of 15.6% since 2009.
Hence, the impact of ambitious unilateral climate change mitigation
policies in Europe on trade appears limited. Our estimates are smaller
but comparable to the study by Aldy and Pizer (2011) which ﬁnds
that an 8% increase in the US electricity prices would lead to an approx-
imately 1% decline in net trade.6. Conclusion
As countries strengthen carbon pricing policies at different speeds,
there is considerable interest around the potential trade impacts partic-
ularly for the energy intensive trade-exposed sectors. This paper mea-
sures the response of bilateral trade to differences in industrial energy
prices, using a 16 year panel dataset that includes 42 countries and 62
sectors (covering 60% of global merchandise trade). The coverage and
detailed disaggregation of the data used goes well beyond previous
work, allowing the ﬁrst global ex-post analysis of the relationship be-
tween trade and energy prices.
We ﬁnd evidence that changes to the relative energy price between
countries have a statistically signiﬁcant impact on bilateral trade. This re-
sult is robust to various estimation techniques and to a wide number of
sensitivity tests. Themagnitude of this effect, however, is small. A 10% in-
crease in the price of energy in the importer country relative to the ex-
porter country increases imports by around 0.2%. Though slightly larger,
the effect remains small in heavy industries, suggesting that trade in
energy-intensive sectors may be more resilient to higher energy prices
than previously thought.
The ﬁndings in this paper suggest that the concerns around short-
term impacts on carbon leakage and trade competitiveness are not entire-
ly ungrounded, but that such concerns may have been overstated. While
carbon leakage and trade competitiveness issuesmay represent a genuine
risk for some sectors, overall, the risks are small in magnitude and the
costs need to beweighted up against the beneﬁts provided by robust car-
bon prices. Importantly, the elasticities obtained in this study can be
interpreted in a broader geographical context compared to previous stud-
ies which examined only industrialised countries. This is important, be-
cause carbon pricing policies are being implemented across the world,
and carbon leakage is no longer a rich nation's problem. For example, car-
bon leakage concerns have been raised following China's pledge to
achieve signiﬁcantGDP energy intensity reduction targets largely through17 We assume that the impact of the carbon price on energy prices is similar in all
European countries, hence intra-EU trade is not affected.
18 The empirical model’s structure is such that it yields common elasticities for imports
and exports. However some asymmetry can arise between the impact on imports and ex-
ports because of differences in sectoral compositions of the EU’s imports and exports.
List of countries and sectors.
2-digit SITC (Rev. 3) sectors included
Countries Australia, Austria, Belgium, Brazil, Bulgaria, Canada, Chile, China,
Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany,
Greece, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Kazakhstan,
South Korea, Lithuania, Mexico, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway,
Poland, Portugal, Romania, Russian Foundation, Slovak Republic,
Slovenia, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Thailand, Turkey,
The United Kingdom and The United States
Sectors Animal feed, Animal oils, Apparel products, Beverages, Chemical
products, Coal and coke, Coffee and tea, Cork and wood, Cork and wood
manufacturers, Cereals, Crude animal and vegetable materials, Crude
fertilisers, Crude rubber, Dairy products, Dyeing materials, Electrical
machinery, Essential oils and perfume, Fertilisers, Fish, Footwear,
Furniture, General industrial machinery, Gold, Hides and skin,
Industrial machinery, Inorganic Chemicals, Iron and steel, Leather
manufactures, Live animals, Meat, Metal manufacturing, Metal ores
and scrap, Metalworking machinery, Non-ferrous metals, Non-metallic
minerals, Non-primary plastics, Ofﬁce machinery, Oil seeds, Organic
chemicals, Other foods, Other manufacturing, Other transport
equipment, Paper and paperboard, Petroleum products,
Pharmaceuticals, Photographic and optical goods, Power generation
equipment, Prefabricated buildings, Primary plastics, Processed animal
and veg oils, Pulp and waste paper, Road vehicles, Rubber
manufactures, Scientiﬁc instruments, Sugars, Telecom machinery,
Textile ﬁbres, Textile yarn and fabric, Tobacco, Travel goods, Vegetable
fats and Vegetables and fruit.
Table 8
Broad sector groups.
2-digit SITC (Rev. 3) sectors included
Energy-intensive Chemical products; Coal & coke; Crude fertilisers;
Fertilisers; Inorganic chemicals; Iron & Steel; Non-metallic
minerals; Non-ferrous metals; Organic chemicals; Paper &
paper board; Petroleum products and Pulp and waste paper.
Non-energy-intensive Apparel products; Beverages; Cork and wood
manufactures; Dairy products; Dyeing materials; Electrical
Machinery; Essential oils and perfume; Footwear;
Furniture; General industrial machinery; Industrial
machinery; Leather manufactures; Metal manufacturing;
Metalworking machinery; Non-primary plastic
manufactures; Other foods; Other transport equipment;
Pharmaceuticals; Power generation equipment;
Photographic and optical goods; Processed animal and
vegetable oils; Prefabricated buildings; Primary plastics;
Road vehicles; Rubber manufactures; Scientiﬁc
instruments; Telecom machinery; Textile ﬁbres; Textile
yarn and fabric and Travel goods.
S140 M. Sato, A. Dechezleprêtre / Energy Economics 52 (2015) S130–S141changes in sectoral composition of GDP (Tekes, 2011). The estimations
from this study predict that changes of production do not imply large
changes in trade patterns, at least in the short-term.
An important limitation of our study is that by deﬁnition, ex-post em-
pirical evaluations can only cover past or existing policies, but the possi-
bility of larger effects on trade in the future cannot be ruled out if efforts
in pollution control diverge signiﬁcantly across countries. There are stark
divergences in the political will to tackle climate change among devel-
oped countries' governments, as exempliﬁed by Australia's decision to
abolish carbon taxes in 2014 and Germany's ambitious energy transition
programme (Energiewende) which aims to reduce greenhouse gas emis-
sions by 80–95% by 2050. The regulatory gapmight also increase between
some emerging economies such as China, Brazil, South Korea, Malaysia
and India, which all play a key role in trade and global supply chains.
Our results might not be valid for much larger energy price differences
across countries than those observed over the last decades.
A key issue for future research is thus to improve the identiﬁcation of
speciﬁc economic activities where pollution leakage and competitive-
ness issues represent a genuine risk; for these speciﬁc activities, to as-
sess the various policy options available to prevent adverse impacts
on trade whilst avoiding the creation of new distortions; and to deter-
mine howenvironmental policies should be adjusted as other countries'
regulations evolve. To carry out these analyses,more disaggregated data
on energy prices faced by sectors is necessary. The sectoral level varia-
tion in the energy price data used in this paper is estimated using vari-
ation in energy mix across sectors, but actual energy prices faced by
sectors might vary because of different degrees of competition or the
types of contracts used in the industry. Availability of more detailed
datawill enablemore robust estimations at the sector level. Better ener-
gy intensity datawith variation at the country, sector and time level will
also allow for additional explorations of how the impact of energy prices
on trade varies with energy intensity at the sector level.
It would also be interesting to use the results from this paper to es-
timate the impacts that fossil fuel subsidy removals might have on
trade. The removal of fossil subsidies is likely to impact the price of fossil
fuels, as has beenmodelled by Schwanitz et al. (2014). However, the in-
formation needed to estimate the impact of fossil fuel subsidy removal
on energy prices implies a level of disaggregation of subsidies (by fuel
type, sector and country) that, to the best of our knowledge, is not yet
available. We hope that improved understanding of the effects of fossil
subsidies removal on energy priceswill in the future enable us to pursue
this question.
Appendix A
Sato et al. (2015) construct an energy price index for a given sector s
in country i, by weighting fuel prices for four carriers (oil, gas, coal and
electricity) by the consumption of each fuel type in that sector–country
(si). Whilst an average industrial energy price level (for all industrial sec-
tors) is readily available for the main fuel types, sector speciﬁc energy
price data ismore difﬁcult to obtain for a large panelwithmany countries.
The construction of sector-level prices using fuel consumption as weights
then addresses the important issue of heterogenous fuel mix observed
across sectors and countries, and is preferable to using the average indus-
try energy price. Sato et al. (2015) constructs two sector level energyprice
series: the Fixed Weight energy Price Level (FEPI) uses ﬁxed weights,
whereas the Variable Weight energy Price Level (VEPL) uses fuel
weights which vary over time. The former is an index, which aims
to capture the within-sector variation, of the change in energy price
level over time for a speciﬁc country-sector. The FEPI is intended to
capture only energy price changes that come from changes in fuel
prices, and not through changes in themix of fuel inputs. It is suitable
for use in time-series and panel data analyses and is used in this anal-
ysis. The latter is instead designed to capture the between-sector var-
iation in energy prices, thus reﬂecting the effective energy price level
(including tax and other policies) for each sector at a particular pointin time. This makes it suitable for cross-sectional analysis and is used
in this analysis in the robustness check, to test how allowing for
changes in the mix of fuel inputs impacts results.
The ﬁxed-weight price index is constructed for each available coun-
try i, sector s and year t, according to the following equation:
FEPIist ¼
X
j
F jisX
j
F jis
 log P jit
 
¼
X
j
wjis  log P jit
 
ð2Þ
where Fisj are the input quantity of fuel type j in tons of oil equivalent
(TOE) for sector s in country i and Pitj denotes the real TOE price of fuel
type j for total manufacturing in country i at time t in constant 2010
USD. The weights, wis
j , applied to fuel prices are ﬁxed over time. The
prices Pit
j are transformed into logs before applying the weights so that
the log of the individual prices enters linearly in the equation. Within
any one country-sector, a consistent set of sub-fuel type is used through
time. Anchor years for the ﬁxed weights are taken at 1995, 2000, 2005
and 2010, and the 2005 one is used in section 4.4, and we also test in
the robustness section, how the results compare using energy prices
using weights ﬁxed at the 2000 and 2010 levels.
Appendix B
Table 7
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